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Abstract. Probabilistic models (developped by workers such as Boltzmann, on founda-
tions due to pioneers such as Bayes) were commonly regarded merely as approximations
to a deterministic reality before the roles were reversed by the quantum revolution (under
the leadership of Heisenberg and Dirac) whereby it was the deterministic description that
was reduced to the status of an approximation, while the role of the observer became
particularly prominent. The concomitant problem of lack of objectivity in the original
Copenhagen interpretation has not been satisfactorily resolved in newer approaches of the
kind pioneered by Everett. The deficiency of such interpretations is attributable to fail-
ure to allow for the anthropic aspect of the problem, meaning a priori uncertainty about
the identity of the observer. The required reconciliation of subjectivity with objectivity
is achieved here by distinguishing the concept of an observer from that of a perceptor,
whose chances of identification with a particular observer need to be prescribed by a suit-
able anthropic principle. It is proposed that this should be done by an entropy ansatz
according to which the relevant micro-anthropic weighting is taken to be proportional to
the logarithm of the relevant number of Everett type branch-channels.
Contribution to Universe or Multiverse? ed B.J. Carr, for Cambridge U.P.
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1. Introduction.
As a prescription for ascribing a priori probability weightings to the eventuality of
finding oneself in the position of particular conceivable observers, the anthropic principle
was originally developed for application to problems of cosmology [1] and biology [2]. The
purpose of the present article is to provide a self contained introductory account of the
motivation and reasoning underlying the recent development [3] of a more refined version
of the anthropic principle that is needed for the provision of a coherent interpretation of
quantum theory.
In order to describe ordinary laboratory applications, it is commonly convenient, and
entirely adequate, to use a “Copenhagen” type representation in terms of a Hilbert state
vector that undergoes “collapse”when an observation is made. However from a broader
perspective it is rather generally recognised that such a collapse can not correspond to
any actual physical process.
A leading school of thought on this subject was founded by Everett [4], who maintained
the principle of the physical reality of the Hilbert state, and deduced that – in view of
the agreement that no physical collapse process occurs – none of the ensuing branch
channels can be “more real than the rest”, despite the paradox posed by the necessity
that they be characterised by different (my italics) “weightings”, of a nature that was
never satisfactorily explained. This intellectual flaw in the Everett doctrine was commonly
overlooked, not so much by its adherents, who were seriously concerned about it [5], as
by its opponents, who were upset by its revolutionary “multi-universe” implications.
The main alternative line of development was based on the (widely accepted) principle
– which will be adopted as the starting point for the present work – that neither the
specialised pure Hilbert space vector, nor the von Neumann probability operator that
replaces it under in more general circumstances, is of an objective physical nature, but
that they are merely mathematical prediction tools of an entirely subjective nature, as also
is the collapse to which they are subjected if and when the relevant information becomes
available. However this approach also came up against a paradox, which was exemplified
by the parable of “Wigner’s friend” [6] (who, in the more detailed discussion below, I
shall suppose to have been Schroedinger, the owner of the legendary cat). The problem
– which became particularly acute in the context of cosmology – was how independent
observers (such as Wigner and Schroedinger) can be dealt with objectively, on the same
footing, by a probabilistic theory of an intrinsically subjective nature.
The longstanding problem of reconciling objectivity with subjectivity is solved here by
the anthropic abstraction, which distinguishes a material observer (such as Wigner) from
that of an abstract perceptor who may or may not perceive himself to be Wigner. The
probability of such a perception must be attributed by some appropriate micro-anthropic
principle, of the kind [3] that will be presented below.
2. Eventualities and observables
Although their ultimate purpose is to account for (and even predict) events, i.e. things
that actually happen, physical (and other) theories are mainly concerned with what I shall
refer to as eventualities, meaning things that may or not actually happen.
Eventualities are subject to partial ordering, as expressible by a statement of the form
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e1 ⊂ e2, which is to be understood as meaning that if an eventuality e1 happens as an ac-
tual event then so does e2. On the understanding that the concept of eventuality formally
includes the special case of the null eventuality, ∅, which by definition never happens,
it can be taken that any pair of eventualities e1 and e2 say will define a corresponding
combined eventuality e1 ∩ e2 whose occurrence as an actual event implies, and is implied
by, the occurrence, both at once, of e1 and e2, so that we always have e1 ∩ e2 ⊂ e1. In
particular, the condition for e1 to be incompatible with e2 will be expressible as e1∩e2 = ∅.
The kinds of (classical and quantum) theory that I know about are all additive in
the sense that for each pair of eventualities e1 and e2 there will be a well defined sum
e1 ⊕ e2 that is an admissible eventuality such that e1 ∩ (e1 ⊕ e2) = e1. In such a case it is
commonly usful to introduce a corresponding concept of complementarity whereby a set
{e} say of eventualities e1, ..., eN will be describable as complementary in cases for which
the sum s = e1 ⊕ ...⊕ eN is an event that must necessarily happen.
An important related concept – on which (though it is less fundamental than that
of an eventuality) discussions of quantum theory are commonly based – is that of an
observable, a term that is used to describe a set {e} of non-null eventualities that is
subject to a condition not just of complementarity but also of what may be termed
mutual exclusivity. An awkward feature of this concept (one of the reasons why I prefer
to attribute the primary role to eventualities rather than to observables) is that it is
difficult to formulate in a manner that transcends the technicalities of the particular kind
of theory under consideration.
For a theory that is classical, in the sense whose meaning will be recapitulated in the
next section, a pair of eventualities e1 and e2 can be considered to be mutually exclusive
if they simply satisfy the incompatibility condition e1 ∩ e2 = ∅, but for a quantum theory
such incompatibility is merely necessary, but not sufficient, for exclusivity in the strong
sense – as defined further on below – that is required for what is meant by observability.
3. The classical paradigm
Some of the simplest and most commonly used theories are of the kind describable
as deterministic, which means that they consist of rules whereby appropriate input data
(such as initial conditions) can be use to single out a restricted subclass of events that
actually happen within a much broader class of conceivable eventualities. However a much
more widely applicable category of theories consists of those that are probabilistic. Instead
of providing rules that clearly distinguish events that happen from other eventualities that
do not, such theories merely provide prescriptions for ascribing what is usually called a
probability (but what some people prefer to call a propensity) – meaning a real number
P in the range 0 ≤ P ≤ 1 – to each of the relevant eventualities, in a manner that must
naturally be consistent with the partial ordering, so that one has e1 ⊃ e2 ⇒ P{e1} ≥
P{e2} and in particular P{∅} = 0. The category of probabilistic theories evidently
includes deterministic theories as the special case for which the range of probabilities is
restricted to the two extreme values, namely P = 1 characterising events, and P = 0
characterising other eventualities that do not actually happen.
A particularly important subcategory of probabilistic theories is that of classical the-
ories. In a classical theory for the description of a system, A say, the admissible even-
tualities will be identifiable as subsets of a corresponding set I{A} that is endowed with
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an ordinary probability measure whose restriction to a subset, e ⊂ I, gives the corre-
sponding probability, P{e}, while the complete set I can be interpreted as representing
an eventuality that is certain, meaning that P{I} = 1. Such a theory will automatically
be endowed with an additive structure whereby any pair of eventualities e1 and e2 will
not only have a combination given by the intersection e1 ∩ e2, but it will furthermore
have a well defined sum that is defined as the corresponding union e1 ⊕ e2 = e1 ∪ e2
so that (unlike what may happen in a quantum theory) its probability will be given by
P{e1 ⊕ e2} = P{e1}+ P{e2} − P{e1 ∩ e2}.
The simplest example of a classical theory applies to the system consisting of a tossed
coin, which can be described in terms of a total of four eventualities. Two of these
eventualities are the independent possibilities e1 say for the tail to turn up, and e2 say for
the head to turn up, while the other two (trivial) eventualities are their sum I = e1 ⊕ e2,
representing the certain event of something turning up, and finally of course the null
eventuality ∅ = e1 ∩ e2 representing the impossible case of nothing turning up. The
latter (trivial) eventualities must always be characterised by P{I} = 1 and P{∅} =
0. The non-trivial part of the probability distribution will be given in the unbiased
version of the theory by P{e1} = P{e2} = 1/2, but could be different in biased versions.
In such a (biased or unbiased) theory the only non trivial observable consists of the
complementary pair of alternatives {e} = {e1, e2}, but of course there is also the trivial
observable consisting just of I by itself.
4. The Dirac - von Neumann paradigm
As in a classical theory, the admissible eventualities in a quantum theory for the
description of a system, A say, will be identifiable with subsets of a corresponding set
I{A}. The essential new feature distinguishing a quantum theory is that I is endowed
with a Hilbert space structure, and that the admissible eventualities are identifiable, not
with arbitrary subsets, but only with those that are Hilbert subspaces.
If e1 and e2 are the Hilbert subspaces representing a pair of admissible eventualities,
their intersection e1 ∩ e2 will also be a Hilbert subspace, representing the corresponding
conjoint eventuality, but their union e1 ∪ e2 will in general not have the structure of
a Hilbert subspace and thus (unlike the classical case) will not represent an admissible
eventuality. The eventualities of a quantum theory do nevertheless have an additive
structure that is naturally induced by the Hilbert space structure: the sum e1 ⊕ e2 is
defined to be the Hilbert subspace that is spanned by the separate Hilbert subspaces e1
and e2. What this means, using the standard notation scheme originally developed by
Dirac [7] (whose lectures on the subject I attended as an undergraduate at Cambridge)
is that |Ψ〉 ∈ e1 ⊕ e2 if and only if |Ψ〉 is a Hilbert space vector having the form
|Ψ〉 = |Ψ1〉 + |Ψ2〉 for some pair of Hilbert space vectors such that |Ψ1〉 ∈ e1 and
|Ψ2〉 ∈ e2. In the particular case for which every such pair of vectors satisfies the
orthogonality condition 〈Ψ1|Ψ2〉 = 0, the corresponding subspacese1 ⊂ I and e2 ⊂ I will
be describable as mutually orthogonal.
Orthogonality in the sense of the preceding paragraph is what characterises the kind
of exclusivity required for the definition of what is generally known as an observable in
the context of quantum theory. Thus an observable (or to be more precise a qualitative
observable, as distinct from a quantititive observable of the related kind to be discussed
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below) in a quantum theory for the system A can be formally defined to consist of a
complete set {e} of mutually orthogonal Hilbert subspaces e1,..., eN , where the condition
of completeness means that they span the entire Hilbert space I{A}, i.e. that e1⊕...⊕eN =
I.
For any particular eventuality, the corresponding subspace e ⊂ I will determine and
be determined by an associated Hilbert space projection operator e = e2 that is defined
– in such a way as to be automatically Hermitean – by the conditions that e |Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉
whenever |Ψ〉 lies in e, and that e |Ψ〉 = 0 whenever |Ψ〉 is orthogonal to the subspace e.
The condition for a set {e} of eventualities, {ei} (i = 1, ..., n) to constitute an observable
is thus expressible as the condition that the corresponding operators should satisfy the
orthogonality requirement ei ej = 0 for i 6= j and that they should satisfy the completeness
condition
∑
i ei = I, where I is the unit operator on I.
In the earliest versions of quantum theory it was postulated that the relevant prob-
abilities would be given just by the specification of a single state vector |Ψ〉 ∈ I{A},
subject to the normalisation condition 〈Ψ|Ψ〉 = 1, according to a prescription expressible
in the familiar form
P [O]{ei} = 〈Ψ| ei|Ψ〉 . (1)
It is to be noted that this is just a conditional probability, subject to the requirement
that the relevant observation, Oe say, be actually carried out.
Soon after the original development of this this Dirac-Heisenberg paradigm, it came to
be recognised that a prescription of the simple form (1) is too restrictive for applicability
to typical cases in which the system A under consideration may interact with another
(internal or external) system, B say. The extended system Â say consisting of the combi-
nation of A and B will be characterised by a Hilbert space Î = I{Â} that is constructed
as the tensor product of I{A} and I{B}. What this means is that a state vector |Ψ̂〉 ∈ Î
for the extended system will be expressible in terms of a basis of vectors |Φa〉 ∈ I{B}
satisfying the orthonormality condition 〈Φa|Φb〉 = δab in the form
|Ψ̂〉 =
∑
a
|Φa〉|Ψa〉 (2)
for some corresponding set of vectors |Ψa〉 ∈ I{A} that will not in general be or-
thonormal, but that must satisfy the condition
∑
a〈Ψa|Ψa〉 = 1 in order for the unit
normalisation condition 〈Ψ̂|Ψ̂〉 = 1 to be satisfied. If ei is a subspace of dimension Ri
within the original Hilbert space I{A} of dimension N{A} say, then it will determine a
corresponding subspace êi of dimension RiN{B} in the tensor product Hilbert space Î,
where N{B} is the dimension of I{B}. Within the original Hilbert space I = I{A} the
corresponding projection operator will have rank given by its trace, namely Ri = tr{ei}
while the corresponding operator êi of projection onto êi in Î will have rank RiN{B}.
According to the natural extension of the rule (1), a unit state vector |Ψ̂〉 in Î will specify
a (conditional) probability distribution given by
P [O]{ei} = 〈Ψ̂| êi|Ψ̂〉 . (3)
In order to express such a prescription within the simpler framework of the original
Hilbert space I{A} of the subsystem A with which we are particularly concerned, it is
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necessary to use a prescription of the kind whose development was attributed by Dirac
to von Neumann.
In the Dirac - von Neumann paradigm, instead of being specified just by a single state
vector |Ψ〉, the (conditional) probability distribution (for the outcome of an observation
Oe if actually performed) is specified by a hermitian probability density operator P say
with unit trace tr{P} = 1 on I according to the prescription
P [O]{ei} = tr{P ei} . (4)
This prescription is compatible with the original pure state paradigm, as specified just
by a single vector satisfying the unit normalisation 〈Ψ|Ψ〉 = 1, according to the formula
(1) whose effect can be seen to be the same as that of simply taking P = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| in the
general formula (4). The advantage of the von Neumann type formulation (4) is that it
can also express the result of the more general prescription (3), whose effect can be seen
to be the same as that of taking
P =
∑
a
|Ψa〉〈Ψa| , (5)
where the (in general non orthonormal) set of vectors |Ψa〉 is as specified by the decom-
position (2).
Many authors – particularly those influenced by the Everett doctrine [4] – have been
continued to hanker after the original Heisenberg type paradigm – meaning the supposition
that the probabilities should ultimately be determined by a pure state in a very large all
embracing Hilbert space characterising the universe as a whole. Such authors – notably
including Hawking [8] – have been inclined to regard the use of a von Neumann operator
as a rather unsatisfactory approximation device that may be made necessary by our
ignorance due to the regrettable loss of some of the relevant information in for example
a black hole [8]. However my own attitude is like that of the distrustful insurance agent
who doubts whether what was alleged to have been lost was ever actually possessed. I
personally see no reason why – to encompass more and more detailed microstructure and
more and more extended macrostructure – the process of construction of successively
larger and larger Hilbert spaces should ever come to an end. In other words the search [9]
for a single ultimate all embracing “Wave function of the universe”, or even of an ultimate
all embracing von Neumann operator, may be like the pursuit of the proverbially elusive
“Will o’ the wisp”. It seems more reasonable to accept that any system sufficiently
simple to be amenable to our mathematical analysis can only be a model of an incomplete
subcomponent of something larger, and that it is therefore unreasonable to demand that
it be describable by a pure state rather than a more general von Neumann operator.
However that may be, these authors would agree that there can in any case be no harm in
working throughout in terms of the von Neumann paradigm, as will be done here, because
it includes the more restricted Heisenberg type pure state paradigm as a special case.
Before continuing, it is to be remarked that the term observable has been used here to
designate what in a more pedantically explicit terminology would be called a qualitative
observable, in order to distinguish it from the quantitative observables that are definable as
functions thereof. Thus any qualitative observable, {e} say, determines and is determined
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by a corresponding equivalence class of quantitative variables, in which any particular
member, E say, is determined by a corresponding non-degenerate real valued function
Ei of the index labeling the admissible alternatives ei for {e}. The condition of non de-
generacy of the function is to be understood as meaning that Ei 6= Ej whenever i 6= j.
In a quantum theory for a system characterised by a Hilbert space I{A}, such a quan-
titative observable will be identifiable with a corresponding Hermitian operator E whose
eigenspaces are the Hilbert subspaces ei ⊂ I{A}, while the corresponding eigenvalues
are the real numbers Ei, so that one has
E|Ψ〉 = Ei|Ψ〉 ⇔ |Ψ〉 ∈ ei . (6)
Such a quantitative variable E will have a mean (expectation) value 〈E〉 that will be given
by the formula
〈E〉 = tr{PE} , (7)
in which the operator E will be expressible in terms of the relevant projection operators
ei in the explicit form
E =
∑
i
Ei ei . (8)
The simplest illustration is provided by the familiar Stern Gerlach example for which
the observable E represents the spin energy of an electron (with respect to its own rest
frame) in a uniform magnetic field. For this application, the relevant Hilbert space I has
only two (complex) dimensions, being spanned by a subspace e1 representing the eventu-
ality that the spin be aligned with the magnetic field, and a subspace e2 representing the
eventuality that it be aligned in the opposite direction. Other eventualities, corresponding
to alignment in other directions, will not be characterised by well defined energy values.
The quantum analogue of the unbiased coin toss theory considered in the previous section
is the unbiased spin theory that is specified simply by adopting the isotropic probability
distribution given (as the high temperature limit of an ordinary thermal distribution) by
P = 1/2 I.
5. Sensors and conditional probabilities.
Having thus completed a brief overview of the basic quantum mechanical principles
that are generally accepted as a matter of consensus, it is now necessary to approach the
much more controversial issue of how these rather abstract principles should be interpreted
in practice – and more particularly how to relate what might observable in principle – in
the abstract sense of the term as used above – to what may be actually observed in the
ordinary sense of the word, taking it that the ordinary meaning of the word observation
is the recognition of the actual occurrence of an eventuality in some particular system
under consideration.
The first, relatively uncontroversial, point that needs to be made at this stage is that
the notion of an actual observation of an eventuality in a generic system under consider-
ation is generally taken to involve an interaction with a specialised kind of system that I
shall refer to simply as a sensor, which might consist of an artificial measuring apparatus of
a simple and easily understandable kind such as a Stern Gerlach spin orientation detector,
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but might also consist of something more mysterious such as the brain of Schroedinger’s
famous cat.
In order for an observable {f} say of a system B say under consideration to be really
able to be (exactly or approximately) observed – i.e. for the recognition of the actual
occurrence of a particular eventuality f j ∈ {f} to be feasible in practice – it is generally
considered to be necessary not just that {f} should be observable in the abstract sense
formulated above, but more particularly that it should be adequately correlated with a
corresponding sensor observable, {e} say, in an appropriate sensor system, A say. The
subsets f̂ j = f j ⊗ I{A} and êi = ei⊗ I{B} in the tensor product space Î = I{A}⊗ I{B}
of the combined system will naturally give rise to a conjoint observable {c} = {e} ⊗ {f},
whose eventualities {cij} are given by the intersection subspaces ĉij = êi ∩ f̂ j . The
probabilities of these conjoint eventualities will evidently form a matrix with elements
P ij = P [O]{cij} . (9)
The first prerequisite for the desired correlation of {e} and {f} is that they have the same
channel number, Ne = Nf , i.e. the same number of alternative eventualities, so that the
matrix P ij will be square. The final requirement for them to be more or less adequately
correlated is that (for a suitable index ordering) the matrix should be more or less exactly
diagonal, i.e. that for i 6= j the probability P ij should be zero or very small. (There is an
extensive literature [10] on decoherence processes by which such diagonalisation can be
brought about.)
The conditions of the preceding paragraph are applicable both to classical and quan-
tum systems. In the particular case of ordinary quantum systems, the observables {e} and
{f} will give rise (on the extended Hilbert space Î) to corresponding sets of projection
operators êi and f̂ i that will automatically commute, [êi, f̂ j ] = 0, and whose products
ĉij = êif̂ j = f̂ iêj (10)
will be the projection operators specified by the corresponding subspaces êi ∩ f̂ j so that
(whether it is satisfactorily diagonal or not) the probability matrix (9) will be obtainable
from the von Neumann operator P̂ on Î in the form
P ij = tr{P̂ êif̂ j} . (11)
It is to be remarked that the relation described in the preceding paragraphs is reflex-
ive, in the sense that if an observable {f} of B is observable by A then the corresponding
observable {e} of A will be similarly observable by B. A graphic illustration is provided
by the gedanken experiment in which Schroedinger put his cat in a box that was equipped
with an anaesthetising mechanism triggered by a Stern Gerlach detector. (Schroedinger
originally envisaged a lethal mechanism, but that would have conflicted with the Pop-
perian desideratum of repeatability of the experiment.) One way of describing this is to
take the detector to be the sensor A, whose reading will tell us about the state of the
cat, considered as system B. However by opening the box one can see directly whether
the cat is still awake, thereby using it as a sensor, A, that will tell us whether the spin
measured by the detector, now considered as system B, was up or down. If one also reads
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the detector as well as opening the box, one can check the validity of the theory: an
inconsistency might remind us of the likelihood for the cat to fall asleep spontaneously,
with the implication that resort to a less satisfactory probability distribution, with non-
vanishing off diagonal elements, might be more realistic for a subsequent repetition of the
experiment.
It is commonly convenient to rewrite the expression for a joint probability such as (9)
in terms of the corresponding conditional probability P [i]{f j} for f j given ei in the form
P ij = P [O]{ei}P [i]{f j} . (12)
In the quantum context we are concerned with here, it can be seen that such a conditional
probablity for f i will be given by the prescription whose form is analogous to that of (4),
namely
P [i]{f j} = tr{P̂[i]f̂ j} (13)
where P̂[i] is the reduced probability operator associated with the subspace êi, as given
in terms of the original (unreduced) probability operator P̂ (on the extended space Î) by
the defining formula
P̂[i] = P i
−1êiP̂ êi . (14)
This formula is such as to ensure automatically that the reduced probability operator
has the properties required for qualification as a von Neumann density in its own right,
meaning that it is Hermitean with unit trace,
tr{P̂[i]} = 1 . (15)
The desideratum that {e} should provide an approximate observation of {f} is equivalent
to the more restrictive requirement that the reduced probability operators should satisfy
an approximation of the form tr{P̂[i]f̂ j} ≈ δij.
6. The subjective nature of a probability operator.
The consensus about what is meant in quantum theory by a – qualitative or quantita-
tive – observable, and by a suitably adapted sensor, in the abstract sense does not extend
to the question of what is meant by the occurrence of an actual observation. There is
however a rather general understanding that it is something that can be performed only
by sensors of privileged class for which the title of observer is reserved. It would be rather
generally agreed, in the context of the example referred to above, that this class would
include Schrodinger himself, but not his (gedanken) Stern Gerlach detector. What is more
litigious is the status of the cat: would its own discovery that it was still awake count as
an actual observation?
Such awkward questions are particularly crucial in the context of what is commonly
referred to as the naive Copenhagen interpretation (“naive” to distinguish it from other
purportedly more sophisticated variants) according to which the von Neumann operator
- or the state vector in the pure case - has the status of an objective physical entity that
undergoes a (non unitary) collapse
P 7→ P[i] (16)
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to the relevant reduced operator (or reduced state vector in the pure case) as constructed
according to the procedure given by (14), when the outcome ei is actually observed for
an observable {e}.
The problem with this naive Copenhagen doctrine is how to give a coherent prescrip-
tion for deciding just when this collapse is supposed to occur. A relativity theorist would
object at the outset that a question about when something occurs implicitly refers to the
concept of time, a concept that is ultimately elusive and at best dependent on a subjec-
tively arbitrary choice of reference system. However there also is a more basic problem
that will arise even in a context for which a reasonably unambiguous Newtonian type
temporal description is available as a good approximation, as would be the case for the
cat experiment if not in other (e.g. cosmological) contexts.
This more basic problem [6] is that of what is known as “Wigner’s friend”. Let
us suppose that the friend in question was Schrodinger himself, and that Wigner was
interested in the fate of the cat. Wigner would have had no direct access to the Stern
Gerlach detector, but would have been able to telephone to Schrodinger to ask what had
happened, thus using Schroedinger himself as the sensor, which prior to the opening of
the box would have been in a mixed state. As far as Wigner was concerned the relevant
collapse process (16) would not have been applicable until the time of the telephone call,
whereas from Schroedinger’s point of view it would have occurred at the earlier time when
the box was opened, while the cat itself would have already known even sooner if it had
not been put to sleep. One might resolve the discrepancy between Schroedinger’s point of
view and that of the cat by taking the line (which might be that of a theologian such as
former Cambridge physics professor, John Polkinghorne [11]) that the subhuman status of
the cat disqualifies it from membership of the privileged class of genuine “observers”, but
no such specious evasion of the issue is available for discrepancy between Wigner’s point
of view and that of Schroedinger, whose equivalent status can not so easily be denied.
The implication of the well known example recapitulated in the preceding paragraph is
that the naive Copenhagen interpretation can not be coherently applied to cases in which
several independent (human or other qualified) observers are involved, which means that
it can ultimately be acceptable only to a (deliberate or subconscious) solipsist.
The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that a probability operator (or state
vector in the pure case) should not be thought of as an objective physical entity, and that –
as would be agreed even by followers of the Everett doctrine, who refuse such subjectivity –
its collapse (16) should not be thought of as a physical process, but just as a mathematical
step whose application will be appropriate whenever the necessary information, namely
the observation of the particular eventuality ei, becomes available. The operator collapse
process (16) is thus merely the quantum analogue of the ordinary Bayesian reduction
process P 7→ P [i] for an ordinary classical probability distribution, whereby its a priori
value is to be replaced by the corresponding a posteriori – i.e. conditional – value when
the relevant information is supplied. Like the classical probability distributions P and
P [i], the corresponding a priori and a posteriori von Neumann operators P and P[i] should
be considered to have a status that is not objective but intrinsically subjective.
A corollary of the foregoing conclusions is the anticipation that observers with different
personal historical backgrounds should use different von Neumann operators, particularly
a priori, although there will of course be a tendency toward agreement a posteriori when
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observational information is shared. In discussions of their (different) opinions about
what is appropriate in cosmological contexts, authors such as Hawking and Vilenkin [9]
tend to use the definite article for what they call “the” state of the universe, but the
reasoning I am developing here would suggest that such definiteness is unjustifiable, and
that the most that is reasonable would be to propose “an” (not “the”) a priori probability
operator.
7. Everett’s concept of branch-channels.
Having recognised the incoherence of the naive Copenhagen interpretation, a newer
school of thought founded [4] by Everett has emphasised – correctly according to the
reasoning I am developing here – that there is no physical process of collapse of the
probability operator. What is not so clearly correct or even meaningful is Everett’s
concomitant conclusion that all the ensuing “branches of the universe” remain equally
real.
Before the validity of this doctrine can be discussed, it is necessary to explain what
is meant by the branches – or to be more precise branch-channels – in question. The
origin of the idea dates back to the pre von Neumann epoch when it was assumed that
the relevant probability distribution would be provided by a pure state, as specified by
a unit Hilbert space vector that could of course be represented as a sum, |Ψ〉 =
∑
i |Ψi〉,
of eigenvectors |Ψi〉 ∈ ei of the observable {e} under consideration. The observation
process was commonly described as having a first step consisting of a splitting of |Ψ〉 into
the set of alternative projections
|Ψi〉 = ei|Ψ〉 (17)
onto the relevant eigenspaces, which were referred to (rather misleadingly) as branches.
According to the naive Copenhagen doctrine, the observation process would be com-
pleted by a second step consisting of a collapse, whereby the set would be replaced by
a single appropriately renormalised branch vector, P i
−1/2|Ψi〉 that would turn up with
the corresponding conditional probability P i = 〈Ψi|Ψi〉. On the other hand the Everett
doctrine denied the occurrence of the collapse as a physical process, with the implication
that the system would be subsequently describable [12] as being in a mixed state, for
which the corresponding von Neumann operator would have the form
P =
∑
i
|Ψi〉〈Ψi| , (18)
representing what I shall refer to as the provisional probability operator, in order to
distinguish it from the relevant (pure) a priori probability operator
P(0) = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| , (19)
and whichever a posteriori probability operator
P[i] = P i
−1|Ψi〉〈 Psivi| , (20)
may turn out to apply.
If the presumption that the system was initially in a pure state is replaced by the more
general supposition that it was in an initial state describable by an a priori probability
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operator, P(0) say, consisting of an arbitrary sum of pure state operators, then by consid-
ering the effect on each member of such a sum it can be seen that the effect of the first
step of the observation process described in the preceding paragraph will be to provide
a provisional probability operator given no longer by the simple formula (18) but by the
more general prescription
P =
∑
i
P iP[i] , (21)
that is known [13] as Luder’s rule, in which the operators P[i] are the a postiori proba-
bilities for the relevant output channels, i.e. the relevant eventualities ei, which are what
Everett referred to as “branches”. In accordance with the formula (14), these a posteriori
probability operators, and the corresponding probabilities, are given in terms of the a
priori probability operator P(0) by
P[i] = P i
−1eiP(0)ei , P i = tr{P(0)ei} , (22)
and it is to be noted that they are also recoverable, using expressions of the same form
P[i] = P i
−1eiPei , P i = tr{Pei} , (23)
from the ensuing provisional probability operator (21).
8. The deficiency of the Everett interpretation
Before exposing the essential deficiency of the Everett doctrine, I would like to rectify
an accessory misconception to which it has given rise. In its usual presentation, the
use of the term branch is motivated by the notion that the number of relevant channels
increases whenever an observation is made. It is important to recognise that this idea – of
perpetual multiplication of the relevant number of branch-channels – is, as a general rule,
misguided. It is based on the – rarely realistic – presumption that the a priori state of the
system under consideration is pure, consisting just of a single branch-channel, whereas
in a generic case (for the reasons discussed above) P(0) will already be mixed, involving
as many branch channels as P, so no actual increase occurs. It is thus more appropriate
as a metaphore to speak of channels rather than branches, which is why I have chosen,
as a compromise, to use the term branch-channel. In any case (even if the initial state
really was pure) the commonly accepted idea that – as more and more information is
obtained by successive observations – the number of branches will go on increasing is also
unrealistic for a different reason, which is that a given finite system cannot continue to
acquire more and more information without limit. After a certain amount of information
has been acquired, the system will saturate, so that further information will be able to
be taken into account only by a (Landauer type [14]) process involving the erasure of
previously recorded information in order to release the necessary memory space. The
number of channels available for useful observation can at best be only a small fraction
of the number of dimensions needed for a complete physical representation of the sensor,
which in practice (if he, she, or it is a system constituted from a finite number of molecules
with a finite total energy in a finite volume) will of course be limited.
Bounded though it must be, the number of branch-channels – meaning the number
of eventualities that may be observationally distinguished – in a given (human or other)
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sensor system can indeed be very large. It is this consideration that has exposed the
Everett proposal [4] that all the branches are “actual, none any more real than the rest”
to the criticism [15] that it entails a “bloated ontology”. However, as I have previously
remarked [16] as far as the scientific desideratum of Ockham’s razor (meaning economy
of formulation) is concerned it does not matter how extensive or otherwise the ensuing
“ontology” may be.
A more serious reason for dissatisfaction with the Everett doctrine of quantum theory
is its failure to apply its own declared rules in a coherent manner, which has made the
question of the interpretation of this “interpretation” the subject of much discussion [17,
5]. The assertion that the branches are “actual” seems to imply their ontological reality,
but Everett’s categorical denial that any one is “more real than the rest” is followed by the
Orwellian admission [4] in a subsequent paragraph that “in order to obtain quantitative
results” the branches must be given “some sort of quantitative measure (weighting)”.
The aim of the Everett program, as expressed by De Witt [17], is to construct a theory
“in which it makes sense to talk about the state wector of the whole universe. This vector
never collapses, and hence the universe as a whole is deterministic”. The troublesome
problem [18, 19, 20] is how to use such an ultimately deterministic model to obtain
the probabilistic predictions that work so well in local applications of quantum theory.
As Graham [5] puts it “Everett attempts to escape from this dilemma by introducing
a numerical weight for each world”.The work of Graham and of Hartle [21] has shown
that Everett’s “weighting” scheme does successfully reproduce the usual probabilistic
predictions, so much so that indeed the distinction between the terms “weighting” and
“probability” can be seen to be merely semantic. Changing its name to “weighting”
(or “propensity”, which is another traditionally favoured alternative) does not solve the
problem of interpreting the meaning of the “probability” that is involved.
It is clear that Everett and his followers have so far failed to achieve their declared
objective. Their bold attempt to solve the – originally local – interpretation problem
by reintroducing determinism at a global level has been helpful for providing a deeper
understanding of many of the issues involved, but the question of how much “reality”
should be attributed to the probabilistically “weighted” branch-channels has nevertheless
remained unsolved until now.
My purpose here is to present a recent clarification [3] whereby this issue is not so
much decided as transcended, in conformity with the precept that questions of ontology
are of a theological nature that is beyond the scope of ordinary science (whose modest
ambition is to account for appearances, and not for ultimate reality, whatever that may
mean). The anthropic approach described below provides a framework in which an intel-
lectually coherent interpretation can be provided in a manner that leaves plenty of scope
for adjustment, and that is compatible not only with an (unbloated) “oriental” option, in
which hardly any of the relevant branches need be considered to be “real”, but also with
a (scientifically indistinguishable, but theologically very different) “‘occidental” option in
which they might all be describable as “actual”.
9. The side issue of the provisional distribution.
Whereas zealous adherents of the Everett doctrine – and a fortiori of the naive version
of the Copenhagen interpretation that was discussed above – would have it that some
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sort of objective reality can be attributed to the state vector on a sufficiently large scale,
and hence to the probability operator that would be relevant on a more local scale,
on the other hand most other schools of thought, including less naive versions of the
dualistic Copenhagen interpretation, would concur with the supposition adopted here to
the effect that such entities are essentially of a subjective nature. This contrasts with
the status of the Hilbert space operator algebra of eventualities and observables, which
have a more objectively well defined nature. According to this principle, the amplitudes
(and corresponding “weightings”) of Everett type “branches” should be considered as
ultimately subjective, whereas the branches themselves can be considered to be objective
– which does not of course entail that such mathematical structures are “real” in any
ontological sense.
Before leaving the subject of the “branching” process (misnamed because the number
of branches involved in the description of a subsystem need not increase, and might even
decrease, when an interaction occurs) it is worth commenting further on the nature of the
process whereby an a priori probability operator P(0) is replaced by the corresponding
provisional probability operator P as given by (21) and (22). The original discussions of
this process were formulated in terms of what Dirac [7] referred to as the Schroedinger
picture, wherein states are considered to have a time dependence whereby the evolution
from an initial time t(0) say to a later time t is given by an operator transformation
P(0) 7→ P that will be given, in the special case of a pure state for an isolated system, by
a corresponding vector transformation |Ψ(0)〉 7→ |Ψ〉. In the special case of an isolated
system, such a transformation will be given by a unitary operator U (that is continuously
generated by some Hermitean Hamiltonian) according to prescriptions of the standard
form |Ψ〉 = U|Ψ(0)〉 and P = UP(0)U−1. However the transformation will in general be of
a less simple (non-unitary) type when interaction with an external system is involved. The
idea, as discussed by von Neumann, was that the preparation of an actual experimental
observation should involve an arrangement whereby a transformation of this latter (non-
unitary) type produced a provisional probability operator P of the required form, as given
by the Luder formula (21).
As originally pointed out by Dirac [7], a representation in terms of such a Schroedinger
picture can be translated into an equivalent representation in terms of the kind of Heisen-
berg picture that has been implicitly adopted throughout the present discussion. In this
kind of representation, the relevant state vector |Ψ〉 or probability operator P is con-
sidered to be time independent, and the effect of Schroedinger type time translations is
allowed for by corresponding transformations of the relevant observables and their con-
stituent eventualities. In the special case of an isolated system these transformations will
be of the standard unitary type, so that for example if e(0) is the projection operator
corresponding to some particular eventuality at a time t(0) then the corresponding time
transposed eventuality at a later time t will be given by
e = U−1e(0)U . (24)
The essential advantage of using a picture of this kind is that there is no impediment to
its extension to (General Relativistic and other) applications for which no globally well
define Newtonian type time parametrisation may be available, so that the concept of a
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time translation relation of the form e(0) 7→ e might make sense only for very particular
locally related eventualities.
As seen from this Heisenberg (as opposed to Schroedinger) point of view, the process
of preparation of an experimental observation in the manner prescribed by von Neumann
should be thought of, not as the replacement of an a priori probability operator P(0) by
a different provisional probability operator P, but as the the replacement of an initially
envisaged, but perhaps maladapted, observable {e(0)} by an appropriately adjusted ob-
servable {e} with respect to which the probability distribution already has the required
Luderian form (21).
From this point of view, there is no need to bother about any distinction between a
priori and provisional probability operators (which – in view of the possibility of using
(23) instead of (22) – were in any case equivalent for the practical observational purpose
under consideration). What matters for the purpose of making what von Neumann would
consider to be a satisfactory observation is the choice of a suitably adjusted observable e.
However the main point I wish to emphasize at this stage is that although it may be of
technical interest in particular applications, the importance of the issue of obtaining a sat-
isfactory observation in the sense specified by Luder’s rule has been greatly exaggerated,
in so far as its relevance to the ultimate interpretation of the meaning of the observa-
tions process is concerned. To start with there is the consideration that the Luderian
desideratum is obtainable not only by the non-trivial process described above, whereby
{e} is adjusted to a previously chosen probability operator, but also by the trivial process
whereby the subjective a priori choice of P is adjusted ad hoc to fit a prescribed observ-
able {e}, an adjustment that in no way diminishes the credibility of its implications, as
can be seen from the equivalence of the prescriptions (22) and (23).
A more fundamental reason why the question of the Luderian transition is irrelevant
is that when an observation has been actually carried out (not merely planned) one
will be left just with a single confirmed eventuality, ei. Such a single eventuality might
be incorporated with others to constitute a complete observable set (spanning the entire
Hilbert space) in many different ways, whose substitution in the Luder formula (21) would
provide many different results. Nevertheless, however that might be, and regardless of
any distinction that may or may not have been made between an a priori probability
distribution P(0) and a provisional probability P, one will be left with an unambiguously
specified a posteriori probability distribution P[i], which is all that matters for the purpose
of subsequent predictions one may wish to make.
The upshot is quite simply that someone (such as Wigner when concerned about
Shroedinger’s cat) should use the a posterior distribution when the relevant information
has become available, and until then should just continue to use the ordinary a priori
distribution. One should avoid getting sidetracked (as so many of Everett’s followers have
been) by intermediate Luderian technicalities, whose analysis is of little relevance to the
two outstanding issues that remain. In addition to the question of interpretation, which
will be addressed from an anthropic point of view below, the other outstanding issue is
of course the usual practical Bayesian dilemma of how to decide quantitatively what a
priori distribution should be used in a particular context – something that can sometimes
be resolved just by symmetry considerations (as in the coin tossing example described
above).
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10. Perceptions and perceptibles.
An important idea that was latent in much of the preceding discussion is that some
privileged eventualities and observables are more naturally significant than others.
In the discussion of Luder’s rule it was remarked that this rule can be interpreted as
selecting a privileged class of observables, but I would emphasize before continuing that
privilege of that kind is not what I am concerned with here, because it is ultimately de-
pendent on an arbitrary subjective choice of the relevant a priori probability distribution.
The kind of privilege I am concerned with here is something that depends on the
essential nature of the system under consideration in a manner that is independent of
the choice of the probability distribution. This is something that could be said about
Bohm’s idea [13] of privileging position with respect to its dynamical conjugate, namely
momentum, but that particular choice is something that would not seem very natural to
the numerous physicists whose mental life is based in Fourier space.
The kind of privilege that seems to me more relevant for the interpretation question
is something that would be rather generally recognised as being imposed by the circum-
stances in particular cases. It is exemplified most simply by the existence of a privileged
choice (determined by the background magnetic field) for the the particular spin eventu-
alities characterised as “up” and “down” in the Stern Gerlach experiment that has been
discussed above. It is exemplified by many familiar kinds of apparatus, such as can be
found in scientific laboratories, and increasingly in ordinary homes, whose output is typi-
cally presented in terms of what, at the highest resolution usually turns out to consist of
simple integer valued observables, such as the alternative eventualities in the range from
0 to 9 for a digit in a counter output, or the binary alternatives for a particular pixel on a
screen to be “on” or “off”. It is mathematically possible to use other bases for a Hilbert
space description of such systems, for example by working with eventualities defined as
linear superpositions of “on” and “off” states of screen pixels, but that is evidently not
the kind of treatment for which such an apparatus was intended by its designer.
Although the degree of complexity of the systems involved is very different, it seems
to me that there is a rather strong analogy between the special role of the “on” and “off”
states for a pixel on a screen and the “awake” and “sleeping” states of Schroedinger’s
cat. The privileged status of the particular eventualities in question can be accounted
for as the result of a process of design that is attributable in the first case, not just to
an individual engineer, but to the collective activity of a scientific community, while it is
attributable in the second case to a very long history of biological evolution by Darwinian
selection. Having said this about the cat, the next thing to be said is of course that the
same applies to Schroedinger and Wigner, for whom the relevant privileged eventualities
are states of mind corresponding to the realisation that the cat is awake or not as the
case may be.
Whatever doubts we may have about the status of the cat, we must recognise that
Schroedinger and Wigner are closely analogous to ourselves (meaning the author and
presumed readers of this essay) which means that insight into the working of their minds
can be obtained from our own experience. Since the only eventualities about whose
reality we can be sure are the conscious perceptions in our own minds (of which some,
namely those occurring in dreams, are evidently uncorrelated with anything outside)
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corresponding to the “mind states” whose essential role has been recognised by several
authors, such as Donald [22], Lockwood [23], and in particular by Page [24], whose line of
approach is followed here. It seems reasonable to postulate the validity of Page’s principle
according to which conscious perceptions are the only eventualities that can be considered
to actually happen. It also seems reasonable to make the concomitant postulate that these
perceptions must belong to some restricted class of privileged eventualities of the kind
discussed in the preceding paragraph. I shall refer to the eventualities of this subclass as
perceptibles.
In his “sensible quantum theory” [24], Page has attributed a privileged role to a class
of observables that he refers to as “awareness operators”, which I interpret to mean ob-
servables whose individual constituent eventualities are the perceptibles introduced in the
previous paragraph. Page has used these particular operators to develop a refined version
of the Everett interpretation, in which the branches – or as I would prefer to say, chan-
nels – that matter are specified with respect to these awareness operators. Thus whereas
Everett’s original version might attribute “actuality” to branches defined with respect to
observables of a rather arbitrary kind, Page’s more refined version would attribute “ac-
tuality” only to branches of an appropriately restricted kind, namely the channels that
are specified by perceptibles. Having thus provided a much clearer idea of which channels
are actually needed, Page was still left with the problem of interpreting what, following
Everett’s evasive example, he referred to as their “weighting”. The point at which Everett
stumbled was in trying to reconcile his recognition that the weighting was needed with
his preceding claim that all the branches were equally real. Page came up against the
same problem with respect to the claim to the effect that all the perceptibles are actually
perceived.
11. The anthropic abstraction
A corresponding paradox is reached from a rather different angle in the approach I am
developing here, which is in agreement with that of Page [24] in so far as the special role
of perceptions is concerned, but differs in affirming that the weighting in question must
be considered to have an essentially subjective and probabilistic nature. The intrinsically
probabilistic nature of models of the kind advocated here raises the problem of what it
can mean to attach a probability to the actuality of an eventuality in the mind of someone
else if the only events one can actually observe are are those occurring in one’s own mind.
Before presenting what I think is the only acceptable way of dealing with this para-
doxical problem, I would mention two less satisfactory ways of resolving the issue that
have been suggested in the past. The first way is of course that of the solipsist, who would
deny the existence of any conscious perceptions other than his (or her [20]) own, with the
implication that the apparent analogy between oneself and others such as Schroedinger is
merely a superficial illusion. The second way (which unlike that of the solipsist has been
followed up deliberately by many physicists, starting with de Broglie) is to revert to a
deterministic description of the world, providing a theoretically well defined answer to the
question of what really happens by denying the (experimentally well established) validity
of the essentially probabilistic description provided by orthodox quantum theory. Neither
the first nor the second of these ways of solving the problem can be said to actually resolve
the paradox: they merely evade the issue by dropping one or other of the essential (exper-
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imentally motivated) elements of the problem, which is that of providing an essentially
probabilistic treatment of perceived reality that respects the apparent symmetry between
different people.
A historical analogy is provided by the incompatibility between Maxwellian electro-
magnetism and Newtonian gravity, which was ultimately resolved by their unification in
Einstein’s General Relativity. The problem to be dealt with here is that of reconciling
subjective probability with objective reality. The only way that I know of for solving this
problem in a satisfactory manner is the anthropic approach, which faces the issue head
on [3] without denying the validity of the considerations that lead to the paradox.
It is worth emphasising, by the way, that the problem is not specifically a problem
of quantum theory, but also arises in probabilistic versions of classical theory, as was
recognised, I suspect, by many of those who were hostile to anything associated with
the name of Bayes. The importance in this context of the quantum revolution is that it
changed the status of Bayesian theorists from that of radicals (because they were willing
to abandon determinism) to that of reactionaries (because they continued to use old
fashioned Boolean logic).
The situation, as I understand it, is as follows. Suppose that to describe a system that
includes ourselves (but, for the sake of finiteness, perhaps not the whole of the universe) we
have set up some (classical or quantum) theory that provides probabilities for an extensive
class of eventualities. This class includes a specially privileged subclass of eventualities
that I shall refer to as perceptibles, which are the only ones that can be actually observed
as conscious perceptions. The set of such perceptions (not just yours and mine, but also
those of everyone else) can be described as objective, and it is the only thing in the theory
that can be considered to be real
You have an objective model attributing probabilities to perceptibles, not only your
own but those of other people. But what sense can it make to attribute a probability to
an observation you cannot make? If you are Wigner, what sense can it make – even in
a classical theory – to use an objective distribution attributing probability to something
that can can only be known by Schroedinger? The contradiction arises when Schroedinger
makes the Bayesian transition to the relevant a posteriori distribution, while Wigner
continues for the time being to use the a priori distribution. How in these conditions can
either of these distributions be considered to be objective?
The resolution to this paradox is provided by what may be called the anthropic ab-
straction (so called because it underlies of what I designated – perhaps inaptly – as the
anthropic principle [26]). The paradox that arises in this case (as in many others) can
be attributed to an unnecessary assumption that has been consciously or subconsciously
taken for granted. The unnecessary assumption is that of knowing in advance who one
is. The anthropic abstraction consists in refraining from assuming in advance that one
has the identity of some particular sensorial observer in the model, so that one’s status
a priori is that what I shall refer to as an abstract perceptor. It is not until the actual
happening of the perception that one can know whether one is Schroedinger, or Wigner,
or whoever else may be included in the model.
It is of course to be understood that the perceptible eventualities that are involved
in this anthropic approach cannot just be of the elementary type exemplified by the
observation that someone else is awake, but need to include eventualities of the more
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complicated kind known as consistent histories [25]. The sort of eventuality that needs to
be envisaged is not simply that of finding oneself to be Schroedinger, but that of finding
oneself to be Schroedinger at a particular instant in his life, with all the memories he
would have had at that moment.
The use (which I see no satisfactory way of avoiding without reverting to determinism)
of the anthropic abstraction entails the need to adopt some kind of anthropic principle,
by which I mean some kind of prescription for attributing appropriate probabilities to the
relevant perceptible eventualities. The rather crude kind of anthropic principle that I have
put forward on previous occasions [2] was concerned with the attribution of probability
to entire observer systems, (such as those associated with the names of Schroedinger or
Wigner) without getting into the details of particular moments in their lives. For the
applications I was then considering, it was sufficient to use a crude statistical treatment
attributing equal weight to all terrestrial or extraterrestrial observers who can be consid-
ered to be sufficiently like ourselves to be describable as “anthropic”. However – as several
authors have already remarked [24, 26, 27] – the more detailed applications I have been
considering here (particularly those involving quantum effects) require the use of a more
refined kind of anthropic principle [3] that will distinguish not just between anthropic
individuals but between different instants in the lives of such individuals.
The question that naturally arises at this point in this line of reasoning is whether it
can suffice to use just the probability weightings that are directly provided by orthodox
quantum theory (such as has been discussed above) in conjunction with some prescription
for deciding which of the many mathematically defined eventualities in the model should
be considered to have the privileged status of perceptibility?
12. Uniqueness of the perceptor?
In the subsequent subsections I shall address the scientifically important question of
the attribution of the required anthropic probability. However before doing so, I would
like to digress by mentioning another question of a less scientific nature that might also
be a subject of philosophical discussion in the future.
This is the question of the nature of what I have referred to as a perceptor, whose actual
perceptions are the only entities within the model that are considered to be real (which
is not to deny the reality, in some theological sense, of other entities beyond the scope of
the model). The perceptor acquires an a posteriori identity (of an ephemeral nature) as
a material observer (such as Schroedinger) on the occasion of an actual perception, but
what about the immaterial identity the perceptor might have a priori?
Is the perceptor unique? The notion that all anthropic observers might just be avatars
of a single perceptor will not seem strange to anyone familiar with oriental (Hindu-
Buddhist) religious tradition. (A scientific analogy that comes to mind is Feynmann’s
idea that the universe is inhabited only by a single electron, which is able to follow all
the world lines that we usually attribute to distinct elections by also following – but in a
time reversed sense – the other world lines that we attribute to positrons.) The obvious
Wheelerian epithet for the succinct encapsulation of this idea – namely that we all share
the same abstract identity –is solipsism without solipsism.
The postulate of a unique perceptor has the advantage of being particularly economical
in the sense required by Ockham’s razor. Nevertheless, in the framework of the occiden-
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tal (Judaeo-Christian-Islamic) religious tradition it might seem more natural to suppose
that there are many distinct perceptors. What is not permissible, however tempting it
may seem, is to suppose that distinct perceptors are correlated with distinct anthropic
observers, such as Shroedinger and Wigner: the essence of the anthropic abstracion is that
a perceptor has the potential for actualisation in any observer state that has a non zero
probability amplitude. The only way you, as a material observer, can claim an exclusive
monopoly of the potential for actualisation of your own perceptor, is by adopting an a
priori probability distribution that attributes no weight to anyone other than yourself, in
other words by adopting the (unnaceptable) autocentric attitude describable as solipsism
with solipsism.
For someone whose objection to the Everett doctine was based not on not on its failure
to follow its own declared rules, but on the ontological bloating [15] implicit in the many
universe doctrine, the present idea that one might adopt a many perceptor doctrine might
be felt to even worse. Whereas the number of Everett branch-channels is restricted, as
I have remarked above, by the limited information content for any finite system, on the
other hand there is no limitation at all on the number of distinct perceptors that might
be conceived to exist, and that might all have a chance of undergoing the experience of
being Schroedinger at some moment in his life.
The idea that there might be an unlimited number of distinct perceptors may be
abhorrent to anyone for whom ontological economy is a desideratum, but on the other
hand it might be extremely attractive to those who still hanker after determinism. Indeed
for those who consider that in order to be meaningful the concept of probability must be
defined in terms of frequencies of the outcome of many identical performances of the same
experiment, the many perceptor doctrine can provide what is desired. If the number of
perceptors is vastly larger than the number of anthropic observers in the model, then each
observer state (even those that are relatively improbable) would actually be perceived
by a large number (albeit a small fraction) of the perceptors. This would provide the
desired frequency interpretation for the probability distribution. By using the anthropic
abstraction in this ontologically uninhibited manner, it is at last possible to deliver what
the Everett program sought, which may be epitomised as probability without probability.
Multiplication of the number of sensors is not the only way of obtaining probability
without probability, if that is what is desired. Another number whose magnification
can achieve the same result is the number of perceptions that each particular perceptor is
allowed to make. The supposition that there is a large number of perceptors, each allowed
to make only a small number of perceptions or, even restricted to a single perception, is
ontologically equivalent to the supposition that there is just a single perceptor who is
allowed to make a large number of perceptions. As far as ontology is concerned, all that
counts is the total number of perceptions.
Whether – as in the oriental version of the anthropic interpretation – there is a unique
perceptor, or whether – as in the occidental version – the number of perceptors is large
(even compared with the number of anthropic observers) – is an issue that belongs to the
realm of theology rather than science. The same can be said about the (more ontologically
relevant) number of total perceptions, which may seem important to those who believe in
probability only when formulated in terms of frequencies, but which in no way affects the
way the theory is actually applied in practice. All that matters for scientific purposes is
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the relative probablity distribution for the perceptions, which will now be discussed.
13. Anthropic weighting: the proper ansatz?
On the basis of what precedes, it seems reasonable to suppose that, from the point of
view of a perceptor, the “net” probability, P say, of a particular perception ei within a
particular subsystem (representing the part of the universe under consideration) should
be given by an expression of the form
P{ei} = Pe P [O]{ei} , (25)
where P [O]{ei} is the ordinary ‘gross” classical or quantum mechanical probability (as
calculated in the manner described above) for the particular perceptible eventuality ei to
occur on the occasion when the relevant Page type awareness observable {e}, is actually
observed, while the Pe is the anthropic factor giving the probability for the perception to
belong to that particular observable set. A sensor of the familiar macroscopic but localised
kind – exemplified by an ordinary computer, or a human observer – will be characterisable
by a fairly well defined world line with a proper time parametrisation τ , in terms of which
the anthropic probability factor will be expressible in the form
Pe = P˙ ∆eτ , (26)
where ∆eτ is the relevant proper time duration, and P˙ is a corresponding probability rate
factor, whose integral
P =
∫
P˙ dτ , (27)
will be interpretable as the giving the total probability for the perception to occur in at
some stage in the life of that particular observer.
Whereas the conditional probability designated by a roman capital P in (25) is of the
ordinary kind that is provided by the relevant classical or quantum physical theory for the
system under consideration, on the other hand the anthropic probability factor designated
by a caligraphic P (which is also conditional in so much as it is subject to the condition
of restriction to that particular system within the universe) can only be provided by what
I call an anthropic principle.
In my earlier discussions of applications [2] that were not concerned with discrimination
between individuals, but with averages over entire populations, it was good enough to
suppose that provided they were sufficiently similar to ourselves (that was the motivation
the – rather debatable – choice of the term anthropic) the relevant total probability P per
observer could be taken to be the same for each one, in accordance with what Vilenkin
has referred to as a postulate of mediocrity, and what I would refer to just as a postulate
of approximate symmetry. The application of such a mediocrity postulate in the present
context gave rise to what I called the weak anthropic principle, whose purport is that the
anthropic probability factor should take a fixed value
P =
1
N
, (28)
where N is the number of anthropic observers that come into existence within the system
under consideration (so that if the system were scaled up to include a larger chunk of the
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universe, with a larger population number N , then the value of P would be correspond-
ingly scaled down.)
The ordinary (weak) anthropic principle formulated in the preceding paragraph will
evidently not be enough for more detailed purposes, such as comparison of the probability
of finding oneself to be someone very short lived (as in the case of a child that dies in
infancy) with that of finding oneself to be someone more long lived (as in the case of a
normal adult). For such a purpose, the most naively obvious possibility is to adopt the
ansatz what I would call the proper anthropic principle, meaning the postulate of a fixed
universal value for the anthropic probability rate P , which would be given numerically by
P˙ =
1
〈τ〉N
, (29)
where 〈τ〉 is the average total proper lifetime of an anthropic observer in the system. In so
far as the total probability over the total lifetime τ of an observer is concerned, adoption
of the proper anthropic principle (29) evidently entails that (28) should be replaced by
P =
τ
〈τ〉N
. (30)
The foregoing proper refinement of the original anthropic principle (28) should, I think,
be good enough for a wide range of applications. However for the purpose of comparing
observers of very different kinds (for which the qualification anthropic might not be so
appropriate) such as extraterrestrials and cats, not to mention babies in our own species,
the plausibility of (29) is much less obvious.
14. Micro-anthropic principle: the entropic ansatz.
A hint toward a more plausible (though not so easily applicable) alternative is dis-
cernible in the response to the eschatological problem posed by Islam [28] that was pro-
vided by Dyson, who suggested [29] that what really matters is not the proper time
duration of an interval but how much information is effectively processed therein. There
is of course room for discussion about how to quantify what is effectively processed (as
opposed to what is merely stored in a memory) in the case even of an ordinary computer
and hence much more so for in the case of a feline or human mind. Estimating that
the duration of a human “moment of consciousness”, which presumably corresponds to
what is denoted here by ∆eτ has the same order of magnitude as was supposed in the
more recent work of Page [24], namely a significant fraction of a second, Dyson deduced
(from the fact that a the heat production of an entire human body is typically about 200
Watts at a temperature of 300o K) that the corresponding entropy production, Qe say, is
of the order of 1023 bits. However experience with the analogous problem for computers
indicates that the amount of information Se that can be judged to have been effectively
processed by the mind itself during the corresponding period of perception – and the
associated Landauer entropy production [14] – must have a vastly smaller value Se ≪ Qe
that is not so easy to evaluate.
A plausible prescription for the evaluation of the processed information Se will how-
ever be available if we have a sufficiently detailed (quantum not just classical) theory to
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characterise the Hilbert space projection operator ei corresponding to a particular per-
ception ei under consideration. If we suppose that this particular perception belongs to a
complete set of eventualities having the same rank (i.e. subspace dimension) Re = tr{ei}
constituting an observable {e} in a Hilbert space of dimension N = tr{I}, so that the cor-
responding number of Everett type branch channels is Ne = N/Re, then the associated
information capacity will be given by
Se = log{Ne} = log{tr{I}} − log{tr{ei}} , (31)
using a logarithm with base 2 if one wants to use Shannon’s bit units, or using a natural
(Naperian) logarithm if one wants to use the entropy units that are commonly preferred
by physicists. This information capacity represents the maximum amount of information
that can be given – for a probability distribution P i (i = 1, ...,Ne) – by Shannon’s formula
S = −
∑
i P i log{P i}.
What I would propose is that the formula (31) be used as an estimate of the amount
of information that can be considered to be processed during the perception ei, and that
the corresponding anthropic probability should be postulated to be proportional to this,
i.e. the required factor in (25) should be taken to be given by
Pe = αSe , (32)
where α is a fixed proportionality factor that is chosen so as to ensure satisfaction of the
usual requirement that the total probability (over all the relevant world lines) should add
up to unity. According to this micro-anthropic principle – which might appropriately be
described by the term entropic principle – the probability rate factor will not have a fixed
value (as was postulated by the proper anthropic principle formulated above) but will be
given by
P˙ = α
Se
∆eτ
. (33)
The advantage of using the term entropic principle for this ansatz is that it emphasizes
its virtue of being applicable in principle not just to observers qualifiable as anthropic,
in the sense of being sufficiently similar to ordinary adult humans, but also to very dif-
ferent kinds ranging from such familiar examples as babies and cats to the highly exotic
extraterrestrial observers whose survival at extremely low temperatures was envisaged
by Dyson. A rather obvious application of this entropic principle is its use as evidence
against Dyson’s conjecture [29] that civilisations constituted by observers capable of sur-
viving at the extremely low temperatures predicted [28] for a non compact universe in
the far distant future would be able to survive indefinitely with respect not just to proper
time but with respect to the relevant information processing measure. If this conjecture
were correct it would mean that the probability measure defined according to (33) by the
entropic principle would diverge toward the future. The contrary prediction by Islam [28]
that “it is unlikely that civilisation in any form can survive indefinitely” is therefore over-
whelmingly favoured by the fact that we do not observe ourselves to be incarnated in
an asymptotically viable low temperature life forms (if any such can exist at all) but in
carbon based life forms adapted to a (cosmologically ephemeral) conditions of moderate
temperature.
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It is to be emphasised that the preceding argument against the likelihood of long
term survival is entirely dependent on the acceptance of the kind of a priori probability
distribution proposed (as a matter of choice, not merely as a tautology) by the anthropic
principle and its entropic extension. Dyson’s writing in this and other analogous contexts
– notably that of the prospects for our own terrestrial civilisation in particular [27] –
give the impression that he personally prefers an a priori probability distribution of the
traditional kind based on what I would refer to as an autocentric (or preordination)
principle, to the effect that the attribution of non zero weighting should be restricted
retroactively to wherever one already finds oneself to be. Although it may be logically
admissible as an alternative to principles of the anthropic kind, I would maintain that
such an autocentric attitude is scientifically unreasonable, in so much as it violates the
desideratum that comparable observers be treated objectively on the same footing. By
adopting such an attitude [30], Dyson implicitly assumes for himself a privileged position
to which other observers (such as Wigner and Schroedinger) are not admitted.
Before leaving the subject of logically admissible (even if not scientifically reasonable)
alternatives to principles of the anthropic kind, I would mention a conceptually possible
alternative that is quite the opposite of the autocentric deviation described in the previous
paragraph. Instead of prescribing an a priori probability distribution with weighting re-
stricted to material observers as in the anthropic case (or to a single privileged observers
in the autocentric case) one might go so far as to envisage the attribution of non-zero
weighting even to situations where no material observer is present at all. Such an un-
reasonably overextended weighting (as exemplified by the kind of ubiquity principle that
was implicit in Dirac’s original argument in favour of his now discredited theory [31, 2] of
varying gravitational coupling) might make logical sense if one could imagine perceiving
oneself to be some sort of disembodied spirit, but (as Dirac’s example shows) does not
deserve trust for scientific purposes.
Illustration
As a toy example to illustrate the application of this micro-anthropic principle, con-
sider a gedanken experiment in which Schroedinger’s cat, C, has equal chance of being
awake or dreaming, as also does its master, M, who, if awake can see whether the cat is
too, but if asleep has equal chances of dreaming that the cat is awake or asleep, whether or
not it actually is. The cat is unconcerned about its master, and so has only two relevant
mind states e1, e2 (awake or dreaming) with entropy S = log 2 = 1. Schroedinger has four
relevant mind states, e3, e4, e5, e6 with S = log 4 = 2, so his net probability is 2/3 while
the cat’s is 1/3. The conditional “gross” probability P , and absolute “net” probability P
for the relevant eventualities are tabulated as follows.
e1: C awake e2: C asleep M: gross→net
e3: M awake, sees C awake P 31 = 1/4 P 32 = 0 1/4 → 1/6
e4: M awake, sees C asleep P 41 = 0 P 42 = 1/4 1/4 → 1/6
e5: M dreams C awake P 51 = 1/8 P 53 = 1/8 1/4 → 1/6
e6: M dreams C asleep P 61 = 1/8 P 62 = 1/8 1/4 → 1/6
C: gross → net 1/2→ 1/6 1/2→ 1/6
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13. Local Application
Whereas the term entropic principle has the advantage of avoiding any risk of misun-
derstanding that the range of applicability of the ansatz (32) extends beyond observers
of narrowly anthropic type, on the other hand the alternative term micro-anthropic prin-
ciple has the advantage of advertising the applicability of the principle (as of its proper
predecessor) not just to the entire life of an observer but to particular parts thereof. The
question of whether one is more likely to find oneself to be nearer the beginning or nearer
the end of one’s life was raised in an epilogue by Leslie [27] who suggested, on the basis of
Everett’s own (confusing) presentation of his doctrine [4], that its continual multiplication
of the number N e of relevant branches entailed a probability distribution that would be
heavily biased towards the last moments of life, on the understanding that the dogma that
all the branch channels are equally “real” implies that the corresponding anthropic prob-
ability factor should be given by Pe ∝ N e (rather than by an expression of the entropic
form Pe ∝ log{N e} that has been advocated here). Having safely survived, and thereby
invalidated, this alarming prediction, Leslie arrived at the observational conclusion that –
as was argued on purely theoretical grounds at the beginning of this essay – this particular
interpretation of the Everett doctrine is untenable.
According to the present analysis, the correct answer to Leslie’s question is as follows.
To start it is necessary to reject not only Everett’s claim that the relevant branches are
“real” (which might be interpreted as meaning Pe ∝ N e) but also his attribution to them,
nevertheless, of an ordinary non anthropic quantum probability weighting (which might
be interpreted as implying the choice of a constant value for Pe). This contradiction
between Everett’s preaching and his practice is resolved in the present approach by what
is interpretable as a compromise, according to which the appropriate formula has the
logarithmic form Pe ∝ log{N e}.
The replacement of a linear by a logarithmic dependence law merely moderates, but
does not avoid, the unrealistic implication that the probability distribution would strongly
disfavour the earlier stages of a lifetime if Everett’s branching metaphor were to be taken
literally. It is therefore obvious that this aspect of what is commonly understood to be
meant by the Everett’s interpretation is also misleading, and, as remarked above, it is
very easy to see why. The idea of a rapidly increasing number of relevant branch channels
is something that may make sense in the case when, for example, one has just taken
delivery of a new computer with entirely empty memory banks, but it will soon ceases
to be valid when saturation sets in so that erasion becomes necessary, so as to release
to release occupied space by a process whereby the relevant information is converted
into Landauer entropy [14]. Concerning the human case, parents and primary school
teachers know that even small children do a lot of forgetting as well as learning, while as
adulthood progresses the ratio of what is learned to what is forgotten goes on decreasing,
so that it may ultimately become quite small compared with unity as senility sets in. This
means that the relevant number N e of Everett branch channels should normally reach
a maximum – not a peak but a plateau – in mid life. It is to be understood that this
statement refers to a smoothed average over diurnal variations, because the number of
channels involved in conscious perception presumably undergoes considerable reduction
during sleep, particularly during deep dreamless phases.
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For practical probabilistic purposes it is only relative values that matter. The intrin-
sically interesting question of the absolute hight of the plateau is beyond the scope of
the present investigation, but it is evident from physical considerations that N e it can
not be nearly as large as the (admittedly gigantic) value of exp{Qe}, where Qe is the
Dyson entropy number discussed above, which exceeds the corresponding Landenauer en-
tropy Se = log{N e} (representing the amount of useful information processed [14] during
the perception) by an enormous thermodynamical waste factor We = Qe/Se ≫ 1. (In
the days before valves were replaced by transistors, the relevant waste factors for com-
puters were far worse even than those of their biological analogues, but the spectacular
progress of engineering techniques in recent years has brought about an amazing rate of
improvement.)
It is a noteworthy coincidence that Dyson’s evaluation [29] of Qe in the human case
gave a value of the same order as the Avrogadro number, which is interpretable as the
number of molecules in a fraction of the order of 10−3 of the mass of a human body. If
it is supposed that this fraction is comparable with the fraction of the molecules that are
active in metabolic processes, then it can be deduced that the corresponding metabolic
turnover time must have a value of the same order of magnitude as the mental time
interval ∆eτ , of the order of a fraction of a second, that was used by Dyson’s as basis for
his evaluation.
This observation – that the estimated duration ∆eτ of a conscious perception is roughly
comparable with a timescale characterising metabolic processes throughout the body –
may offer a significant clue as to the nature of the (still largely mysterious) mental pro-
cesses involved. One of the things that is rather clear is that the relevant value of ∆eτ
can undergo considerable variation – lengthening in states of hibernation for example.
In so far as the solution to the problem posed by Leslie is concerned, what is relevant
is the age dependence of ∆eτ . My impression, with which I think most people would
agree, is that the typical duration of a moment of consciousness is relatively short in early
childhood and that on average – modulo diurnal fluctuations through states of shallow or
deep sleep – it increases monotonically throughout life. According to the formula (33),
this means that the maximum of the anthropic probability distribution need not coincide
with the summit of the midlife plateau where the relevant branch channel number N e
and its logarithm Se is highest, but may actually occur at a more youthful stage.
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Figure 1: Some of the participants at the Clifford Centennial meeting organised by John
Wheeler at Princeton in February, 1970, assembling many of the people whose thoughts
contributed to the synthesis presented here, including, in the front at left, Bob Dicke
with Eugene Wigner, and in the center Stephen Hawking with the present author, behind
whom are Bryce DeWitt with Freeman Dyson.
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